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The Banking Union: Agencies and the Lesson from the US  
 
Luigi Lonardo, Phd Candidate, King’s College London 
 
1. Introduction 
Independent agencies, despite not being new to the EU1, have proliferated since the 2008 crisis. 
Agencies have been one of the legal responses common to both waves of the crisis: the 2008-
2012 financial crisis and the 2012 Euro-zone crisis2.  
The first wave sparked as regulatory response, since 2010, the creation of a the internal-market-
wide European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)3. The ESFS is composed of National 
Competent Authorities as well as of new EU agencies, created to strengthen and control EU 
financial system governance. These agencies are the European Systemic Risk Board4; the three 
sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): the European Banking Authority (EBA)5, the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)6, and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)7, and a Joint Committee, which coordinates them.  
The supervisory powers transferred to these ESAs were, as Moloney notices8, relatively 
contained. The considerations that limited the powers of the ESAs were political and legal. 
Politically, the fiscal costs which the initial series of crisis-era bank rescues by Member States 
imposed on domestic tax -payers9 shaped the profound resistance by some Member States10 to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012) 144-146. 
2 Christos Hadjiemmanuil, “Bank Resolution Financing in the Banking Union” LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 6/2015, 5-6 constructs a slightly different narrative of the crisis, dividing in three waves.  
3 Together with two mechanisms originally formed outside the framework of the Union: first a temporary collective 
mechanism for economic rescue, the European Financial Stabilization Fund,
 
and then a permanent mechanism, the 
European Stability Mechanism. 
4 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European 
Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (EU) 
No 1092/2010. 
5 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing 
a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC.  
6 REGULATION (EU) No 1094/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC.  
7 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing 
a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision 
No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC. 
8 Niamh Moloney, “European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience” (2014) 51 Common Market Law 
Review 1609. 
9 The public capital injected into EU banks over 2008 - 2012 is estimated to be in the region of €413.2 billion, 
amounting to 3.2% of EU GDP in 2012: Commission, European financial stability and integration report 2013 
(2014), SWD (2014)170, p. 74. 
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the transfer of executive powers with fiscal implications to the EU. Legally, the restrictions 
which apply to EU agencies under the Meroni doctrine limited the extent to which the European 
Supervisory Authorities could be empowered to take supervisory decisions11. 
However, by 2012 Euro area Member States entered a new phase of economic distress. The 
catastrophic consequences felt in some Euro-zone countries as a consequence of the sovereign 
crisis12, pushed MSs to set up the Banking Union, which entailed the transfer of significant 
supervisory and regulatory powers to the Single Supervisory Mechanism13 and the Single 
Resolution Mechanism14. However, given the high stakes of the decisions of these bodies, they 
give rise to concern of judicial protection, political and legal accountability. However, they have 
been established despite these concerns because it was felt necessary to overcome “political and 
legal obstacles previously thought insurmountable”15. In other words, it was the worsening of the 
crisis that forced the MSs to come up with such a solution.	   
Is this choice justified?   
In order to answer this question, and to contribute at sketching a theoretical framework of 
administrative law under which to understand the developments of the Banking Union legal 
construction, this paper draws insight from the US experience.  
First, the paper explores the concern over the judicial and democratic control over the acts of two 
agencies created during the second wave, the Eurozone crisis. They are Banking Union agency, 
even though one of them, the Supervisory board, is technically not an agency. The Supervisory 
Board, of the ECB, for the purposes of this analysis, will be considered a de facto agency16.  
This paper considers the two most recent boards of appeals, which are independent 
commissions which resolve disputes related to the body or agency. They are established by 
secondary legislation in the context of the Banking Union: the SSM Resolution (together with a 
Decision of the ECB) and the SRM Resolution. These boards of appeals are ad hoc independent 
commissions which resolve disputes related to acts of the agency itself.  
The Administrative Board of Review carries out an internal administrative review of some 
decisions taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) regarding the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions.  
The Appeal Panel of the Single Resolution Mechanism. The Board of Appeal hears 
appeals against the decisions of the Single Resolution Board within the SRM. The paper explores 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The main conflict line was between the UK (rigidly opposed to any transfer of powers with fiscal consequences) 
and often supported by Spain and the Czech Republic, and France, often supported by Italy,  
11 Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
12C Hadjiemmanuil (n 2) 3. 
13 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (hereinafter, the SSM 
regulation) 
14 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the 
resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism 
and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (Hereinafter, SRM Regulation) 
15 N Moloney (n 8). 
16 Definition is also in Harlow and Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Hart 2014) 292.  
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the main legal issues that arise for the judicial protection of physical and legal persons who can 
challenge the measures of these agencies. 
	  
Second, the paper draws insights from the creation of a unitary market in the United States. 
Much like the EU since 2008, nineteenth-century United States also experienced debt crises and 
default. The classical study of Skowroneck17 shows that the US reacted with new administrative 
capacities and policy instruments to preserve the market. Even before the establishment of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, which marks the emergence of regulatory agencies, 
the expansive role for administrative discretion emerged under broad delegations of 
Congressional authority. As authors such as Mashaw and Perry18 have explained by analysing 
the role of administrative role in APD, the Congress generated substantial regulatory activity on 
the part of administrative agencies, through permissive acceptance of administrative adjudicatory 
and enforcement authority. Thus, APD offers an important reference point for understanding the 
institutional allocation of power. It shows that integration also passes by stages where agencies 
have to enjoy a rather large amount of discretion. 
 
This paper contributes to conceptualising the Euro-crisis by applying a “lesson” from American 
Political Development (APD) and Independent Agencies (IAs) in the European Union (EU). 
APD is the study of the evolution and integration of the market of the United States. It’s a 
multidisciplinary field of study, to which economists, lawyers, political scientists and historians 
contribute APD studies the construction and evolution of US institutions, broadly defined as to 
include for example the unitary market. Building, regulating and then liberalising an internal 
market, is arguably EU’s most vital task. The theories of APD can be applied to the latest 
Banking Union agencies in order to gain a better understanding of the fundamental tension 
between the need for specialised decision-making by unelected IAs and the commitment to be 
governed by the people. 
The paper argues that IAs may be necessary to achieve this aim. It explores a potential trade-off 
between the potential loss of democratic scrutiny and more efficient governance. IAs may indeed 
prove –as a result of the crisis- to be a tool around which further integration will pivot. Absent 
sound finances, regulatory agencies may be the most efficient instrument to achieve the desired 
policies. 	  
	  
	  
2. The Banking Union’s newest agencies 
	  
In constitutional and administrative law, independent agencies enjoy a special19 and somehow 
ambiguous status. This is true for the EU and for the US alike. In the US are so-called 
independent agencies, those entities where at least one individual is appointed by the president to 
a full-time, fixed-term position with the advice and consent of the Senate and has protection, by 
statute or custom, against summary removal. These constitute what is sometimes referred to as  a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Stephen Skowroneck, Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 
1877-1920 (CUP 1982). 
18 J. L. Mashaw and A. Perry, “Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the Antebellum Republic” (2009) 
7 Michigan State Law Review 7. 
19 Paul Verkuil, “The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies (1988) Duke Law Journal 257 
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“headless fourth branch” of the Government20, i.e., a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies 
and uncoordinated powers. Despite this famous definition, however, American IAs rather range 
on a spectrum whereby each agency enjoys more or less independence and discretionary power 
depending on their statutory authority, structure, traditions, or culture21. 	  
The United States has known the administrative practice of delegating power to independent 
agencies at least since the late 19th century22. But while in the US "independence" is used with 
reference to the president23, or to the party system24, in the EU independence is best understood 
with reference to political games25, as a way of fostering integration without this passing by the 
political arena. 
The reasons for this preference are the problems to be addressed are highly technical and 
agencies have technical expertise to solve them26; that the economic principle of the division of 
labour allows political institutions to focus on core policy-making while specialised agencies 
concentrate on sectorial task.s; the spread of agencies beyond Brussels and Luxembourg adds to 
the visibility of the Union27; Agencies have proved particularly relevant in field of shared 
competences, when the implementation of new policies at Community level needs to be 
accompanied by close cooperation between the Member States and the EU28; that regulating a 
subject costs less than putting money on the market; or a mix of these29.  
However, the new agencies are troublesome from the standpoint of judicial protection. The 
problem is of the remedies available against the decisions of these agencies give rise to issues of 
political and legal accountability30. Not all agree with this analysis. Some commentators have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The president’s committee on administrative management, report of the committee with studies of administrative 
management in the federal government (1937).  
21 Marshall J. Breger and Gary J. Edles, Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics 
(OUP 2015). As a matter of example, many multimember agencies have the full range of regulatory authority, that 
is, they can issue rules, take administrative action to enforce their statutes and regulations, and decide cases through 
administrative adjudication. Some oversee a specific area of the economy. For example, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates interstate aspects of the electric power, natural gas, oil pipeline, and 
hydroelectric industries; and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) administers the federal securities law 
and regulates firms engaged in the purchase or sale of securities, investment companies, and people who provide 
investment advice. Others have substantive, subject-matter responsibilities that cut across industry lines. For 
example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces a variety of federal antitrust and consumer protection 
statutes. 
22  Marshall J. Breger and Gary J. Edles (n 21) 1. 
23 This was the understanding of the US Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624, 
625–26 (1935)  
24 Martin Shapiro, “The Problem of Independent Agencies in the United States and the European Union” (1997) 4 
Journal of European Public Policy 276. 
25 As poignantly explained by Shapiro almost twenty years ago: “If currently direct routes to further political 
integration of the Union are blocked, following Haas’s old arguments about the World Health Organization and the 
UN, further growth can be achieved indirectly through the proliferation of small, limited jurisdictions, allegedly 
‘technical agencies’ that will appear politically innocuous”. Shapiro (n 24) 281 
26 Paul Craig, (n 1) 141. 
27 Communication from the commission to the European Parliament and the Council European agencies – The way 
forward Comm (2008) 323, 1. 
28 Comm 2008 (n 27) 323, 5. 
29 Commission, The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies COM(2002) 718 final , p 10. 
30 See below Section  
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taken the view that, as far as the SRM is concerned, “The rules on judicial protection follow 
contemporary standards in this field”31 and that the SRM’s judicial protections is “by and large, 
adequate”.32 
Some authors, instead, have voiced concerns about the the application of the rule of law to 
procedures followed by the SRB33. Others considered that "the scarce attention paid to the good 
governance values of due process and accountability” was "a striking feature" of the 
Commission’s original plans for banking supervision34. The principle of good administration is 
enshrined in Article 41 of the EU Charter of fundamental rights synthetizing some of the case 
law of the Court of Justice in this field35
 
is of particular relevance to administrative procedures. 
According to the Charter the right to good administration requires that decisions be taken 
pursuant to procedures which guarantee fairness, impartiality and timeliness36. An element of the 
good administration principle is the duty of care, which includes the right of every person to 
have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time37. Impartiality 
requires the absence both of arbitrary action and of unjustified preferential treatment including 
personal interest38. The three institutions, in a 2012 joint statement, warned specifically on the 
importance of the impartiality and independence of the Members of the Boards of Appeals of 
regulatory agencies39.  
There is a tension between the struggle to efficiency and the need to ensure a standard of 
democratic accountability in line with the general principles of EU law and of the Charter of 
fund rights.  
 
2.1 The Administrative Board of Review (ABR) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.3 Areas of tension 
31 Georgios I. Psaroudakis & Basil C. Scouteris Greek report, XXVII FIDE Congress (Vol 1, Wolters Kluwers 2016) 
22. 
32 Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou and Phoebus L. Athanassiou,∗Cypriot report, XXVII FIDE Congress (Vol, Wolters 
Kluwers 2016) 21. 
33 Eilis Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 2015) 
478, with reference to the SRB adoption of a resolution scheme.  
34 C Harlow and R Rawlings (n 16) 294. 
35 The CJEU has referred to good administration principles since the very early case-law: Joined Cases 7/56, 3/57 to 
7/57 Algera and Others v Common Assembly of the ECSC [1957] ECR 0039; Case 32/62 Alvis [1963] ECR 49, para 
1A; Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299; Case 64/82 Tradax v 
Commission [1984] ECR 1359; see the Explanations Relating to the Charter Of Fundamental Rights, Doc. 2007/C 
303/02, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri =OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035:en:PDF 
36 Directorate General for internal policies, “The General Principles of EU Administrative Procedural Law”2015, 18 
37 Art 41(1) Charter. 
38 Case T-146/89 Williams v Court of Auditors [1991] ECR II-1293, para. 40; Case T-305/94 Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij v Commission [1999] ECR II-931, paras. 317ff. 
39 Joint statement on decentralised agencies and the subsequent common approach of Parliament, the Council and 
the Commissions signed on June 19, 2012. 
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The SSM regulation requires the ECB to establish an ABR40 and to adopt a decision setting out 
its operating rules, with the objectives of strengthening the legal protection of natural and legal 
persons and for reasons of procedural economy41.
 
In compliance with this provision, the ECB 
has adopted a decision on 14 April 2014 establishing the ABR and its Operating Rules42. The 
analysis that follows is structures around four questions: what acts can be challenged before the 
board? By whom? On what ground? And what are the effects of the challenge? 
 
 
-­‐ What can be challenged? 
 
Under Art 24(1) SSM Regulation  and 7(1) ABR Decision, the ABR hears appeals on the 
decisions adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks as they have been conferred 
upon it by the SSM mechanism. 
 
 
-­‐ By whom?  
 
Pursuant to Article 24 (5) SSM Regulation, any natural or legal person may request a review of 
an ECB decision if such decision is addressed, or is of a direct and individual concern, to that 
person. These requirements are the same as in an action for annulment pursuant to Article 263 
(4) TFEU, therefore the case law of the CJEU should be applicable to determine the rules on 
standing. A request for review to the ABR (called a ‘notice of review’ in the ABR Decision) 
shall be made in writing, including a statement of grounds. The time limit is one month from the 
date of notification of the decision to the person requesting the review, or, in the absence of a 
notification, of the day on which it became known to such person. 
 
-­‐ On what grounds? 
 
If the request is admissible, the ABR carries out an internal administrative review with regard to 
the procedural and substantive conformity of supervisory decisions with the SSM Regulation43. 
In the light of Article 4 (3) SSMR, this means that the ABR will fully review the legality of the 
decision against the entire corpus of Union law and, this include, crucially, national 
implementing law, as applied by the ECB. Pursuant to the ABR Decision, the legal review shall, 
however, be limited to an examination of the grounds relied on by the applicant as set out in the 
notice of review,
 
making careful preparation of the notice of review essential44. However, this 
restriction may be in contrast with the SSM Regulation. Article 24 SSM Regulation does not 
contain any such limitation. Moreover, the ABR Decision itself explicitly states that, when 
preparing a new draft decision, the Supervisory Board will not be limited to an examination of 
the grounds relied upon by the applicant in the notice of review. 
 
-­‐ What are the effects? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 For an overview: The SSM Framework Regulation. Part 2: Administrative procedure, legal remedies and 
transitional provisions, June 2014. 
41 Preamble SSM Regulation. 
42 Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 April 2014 concerning the establishment of an Administrative Board 
of Review and its Operating Rules (ECB/2014/16) (Herein, the ABR Decision).  
43 Art 10(1) ABR Decision, Art 24(1) SSM Regulation. 
44 Art 10(2) ABR Decision. 
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Much though actions for annulment before the CJEU, a request for review submitted to the ABR 
pursuant to Article 24 (5) SSM Regulation does not automatically have suspensory effect of the 
appealed decision. However, the Governing Council, upon a proposal being made by the ABR 
directly to it and not via the Supervisory Board, may suspend the application of the decision 
under review.
 
If the applicant wishes to apply for the review to be given suspensory effect, it 
shall state the grounds for such application.
 
The ABR Decision provides that the request for 
review must be admissible and not obviously unfounded In addition, it must be established that 
the immediate application of the contested decision may cause irreparable damage to the 
applicant. 
Moreover, under Article 34 SSMFR the ECB may suspend, ex officio, the application of a 
supervisory decision in the initial decision itself, or, even outside of a review procedure before 
the ABR, upon the request of the addressee of a supervisory decision.  
 
If the request is deemed admissible, the ABR expresses its opinion on the matter brought to its 
attention “within a period appropriate to its urgency, but no later than two months from the 
receipt of the request”. The opinion shall be in writing and contain reasons.
 
The opinion of the 
ABR, however, is not binding, and does not automatically replace the decision of the ECB. The 
ABR simply remits the case for preparation of a new draft decision to the Supervisory Board. 
The Supervisory Board shall, taking into account the opinion of the ABR, but not being limited 
to the grounds relied upon by the applicant in the notice of review,
 
promptly submit a new draft 
decision to the Governing Council. This new decision either abrogates the initial decision, 
replaces it with a decision of identical content, or replaces it with an amended decision. It shall 
be deemed adopted unless the Governing Council objects to it within a maximum period of ten 
working days. Crucially, a review of this new decision of the Governing Council cannot be 
requested before the ABR.
 
In this case, if the applicant wants to appeal the new decision, the 
only available avenue is applying for judicial review with the CJEU under Art 263 TFEU.  
 
	  
2.2 Appeal Panel of the SRM 
The SRM Regulation45, Art 85, provides for the establishment of an Appeal Panel (AP) to hear 
claims concerning the decisions of the Single Resolution Board. The Single Resolution Board 
(SRB), which was established on 1 January 2015 and is operative since 1st January 2016, is a 
Brussels based agency with legal personality and independent finances. In its plenary session, the 
SRB comprises its chair, the vice-chair, four permanent members and representatives of the 
national resolution authorities of all participating Member States. The ECB and the European 
Commission have observer status in the SRB. The SRB is the resolution authority of the Banking 
Union, and it was set up in order to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks in participating 
Member States, with minimum impact on public finances and taxpayers. 
-What can be challenged? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 For an overview: Christos Gortsos, The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF). A comprehensive review of the second main pillar of the European Banking Union (ECEFIL, 2nd ed, 2016) 
67. 
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The AP can hear appeals lodged against a decision of the Board referred to in Article 10(10) on 
the assessment of resolvability, Article 11 on the application of simplified obligations or the 
waiver of the obligation to draft resolution plans, Article 12(1) on the minimum requirements for 
own funds and eligible liabilities, Articles 38 to 41 on the imposition of fines and periodic 
penalty payments, Article 65(3) on the contribution to the board’s administrative expenditures, 
Article 71 on the raising of extraordinary ex-post contribution and Article 90(3) on access to 
documents 46. Finally, it is worth noting that there is no possibility to appeal the decisions 
regarding actual bank resolution under Art. 18 of the Regulation. 
-By whom? 
 
As far as the rules on standing are concerned, Art 85(3) SRM Regulation uses the usual 
formulation, that the decision has to be addressed to the natural or legal person challenging it, or 
has to be of “direct and individual concern”. The applicant has six weeks to appeal. 
 
-On what grounds? 
 
The legislation does not mention on what grounds can the AP review the decisions. It is therefore 
debatable whether the applicant can question only the legality of the challenged measure or also 
extend the claim to the substantial correctness of the relative technical evaluations. Chirulli and 
De Lucia hold the opinion that, given the open wording of the specific norm, which refer only to 
“the complaint of the interested party”, the applicant is not barred to challenge the decision even 
on substantive grounds. This means that AP would be able to review procedural and technical 
aspects as well as the merits of the contested decision47. 
 
- What are the Effects? 
 
An appeal lodged pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not have suspensive effect.  
However, the Appeal Panel may, if it considers that circumstances so require, suspend the 
application of the contested decision48. The Appeal Panel may only either confirm the decision 
taken by the Board, or remit the case to the latter. The Board shall be bound by the decision of 
Appeal Panel and it shall adopt an amended decision regarding the case concerned49  
The decision of the Board of Appeal is binding, and, under Art 86(1), it can be challenged before 
the CJEU: in accordance with art 263 TFEU contesting a decision taken by the Appeal Panel or, 
where there is no right of appeal to the Appeal Panel, by the Board. Or under 265 for failure to 
act of the board. 
 
2.3 Areas of tension 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Art 85(3) SRM Regulation. 
47 Paola Chirulli and Luca De Lucia, “Specialised Adjudication in EU Administrative Law: the Boards of Appeal of 
EU agencies” (2015) European Law Review 832, 846. 
48 85(6) SRM Regulation. 
49 85(8) SRM Regulation. 
	   9	  
Neither the Administrative Board of review nor the Appeal Panel have yet handled a single case. 
Therefore, at this stage, only a description of the potential legal issues is possible. It is however 
already apparent that the law which set up these bodies give rise to some tensions: there are 
issues, faced by the natural or legal person who lodges the appeal (the applicant) of transparency, 
of cost, and of procedural safeguards.   
To begin with, the ABR does not have binding powers. It means that it is always the Supervisory 
Board who has the ultimate saying on the matter, since it can disregard the opinion of the ABR 
and re-adopt a decision of identical content (subject to the Governing Council not objecting 
within ten days)50. The independent body, therefore, does not really act as a judicial organ and its 
powers are very limited. The SSM Regulation at Art 24(11) states that the setting up and 
functioning of the ABR is without prejudice to the right to bring proceedings before the CJEU in 
accordance with the Treaties.	   
However, starting proceeding before the CJEU, which is possible both under Art 24(11) SSM 
Regulation and under Art 86(1) SRM Regulation, is costly and time consuming (procedural 
economy was indeed one of the reasons for the creation of the ABR). In particular, as far the 
SRM is concerned, it is possible to appeal decisions of the BoA to the CJEU, or those decisions 
of the SRB where there is no appeal possibility to the Panel. Such actions to the CJEU must be 
brought in accordance with Art. 263 TFEU. If the action is well founded, the CJEU is to declare 
the act concerned to be void (Art. 264 TFEU). Proceedings before the CJEU are not only 
burdensome in terms of money51, but also in terms of time52. The time element is particularly 
striking if compared The particular nature of the decisions taken especially by the SRB makes it 
so that having to wait, in average, more than one year before the CJEU issues a ruling53, 
frustrates the purpose of the decision and of the review.  
 
Another fundamental problem is that it may be difficult if not impossible for applicants to 
comply with the time limitation of Art 263(6) TFEU (within two months of the publication of the 
measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it 
came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be), if they have to pass through the AP or 
the ABR before. This problem is avoided only if the applicants can challenge the new decision 
(that substitutes the previous one, even if identical) within those time limits.  
 
The proceedings before the ABR and the AP also presents difficulties in access to documents. 
The two panels cannot undertake any further investigation or collect fresh evidence on their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Art 24(7) SSM Regulation. 
51 Even though proceedings before the CJEU are not necessarily more costly than those before the appeal panels. 
The other Appeal Panels of EU agencies foresee an application costs, the CJEU does not. The AP of the SRM and 
the ABR have not yet established an application cost to begin proceedings before them.	  	  
52 See the Court’s case law on lengthy proceedings C ase C 50/12 P, Kendrion v Commission [2013] ECR- 771, 
Case C 58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne [2013] ECR 770, Case C 40/12 P, Gascogne [2013] 768. Proceedings of 
reasonable duration are a right under Article 47 of the Charter (which provides that “everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”) and are 
related to the principle of effective judicial protection. 
53 “In the case of direct actions, the average time in 2015 was 17.6 months, which amounts to a significant reduction 
compared with the preceding years (between 19.7 months and 24.3 months in the period from 2011 to 2014)” 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-03/cp160034en.pdf . 
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initiative54.  
Moreover, as Chirulli and De Lucia noted55, even though the European Courts define them as 
"quasi-jurisdictional bodies"56, the board of appeals of EU agencies in general (and thus certainly 
the SRM AP) do not have formal judicial powers and cannot be considered courts. This means 
that the applicant cannot properly rely on a right to a “fair hearing” 57. 
 
Finally, it could be argued 58that the lack of a possibility to appeal the decisions on resolution is 
an infringement of the right to property enshrined in the Unions Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Art. 17(1)), and the CJEU has also recognised this for the first time in Case 44/79 Hauer.59	  
	  
	  
3. The lesson from APD  
 
The study of American political development—APD—emerged in the early 1980s as subfield of 
the study of American Politics. It seeks to analyse political contemporary phenomena through a 
diachronic lens60,. APD as a field of study is shaped by historians, economists, lawyers and 
political scientists alike. The field has been described as “insurgent” because it “brings the idea 
that “history matters” into the center of political analysis and prizes fresh answers to questions 
that are never taken for granted within APD”61 
APD has studied the simultaneous transformation of institutions and polity, and how these 
generated substantial protest about prevailing economic and democratic conditions. The 
dynamics that were encountered by the US (expanding market, expanded administrative 
capacity, trade-off between democratic legitimacy and economic efficiency, market activities, 
and corresponding industrial developments, and durable inequalities) are relevant for the current 
debates in Europe. It is so because the EU can draw lessons from the regulatory and 
administrative mechanisms which, in 19th century America, fostered market consolidation. 62 
Scholars of the EU have had recourse to APD both to explain other EU policy-making areas63 as 
they have in order to deal with economic governance64 or fundamental rights65 by comparing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Art 15 ABR Decision  
55 Chirulli and De Lucia (n 47) 
56 Case T-133/08, Schräder v CPVO — Hansson [2010] ECR 430, par 137 and 190.   
57 Case T-63/01, Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2002] ECR II-5255. 
58 See eg the Finnish report, FIDE XXVII Cogress (Vol 1, Wolters Kluwer 2016) 21. 
59 Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR I-3727. 
60 The fundamental work by Paul Pierson, “Politics in Time” for example, has a threefold purpose: to advocate that 
political scientists situate arguments in temporal perspective, to illustrate a number of ways in which they might do 
so, and to argue that much of the discipline does not presently take time seriously enough. Paul Pierson. Politics in 
Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. (Princeton University Press 2004). 
61 Suzanne Mettler and Richard Valelly, “The Distinctiveness and Necessity of American Political Development” in 
Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of American Political 
Development (OUP 2016). 
62 Egan, Single Markets: Economic Integration in Europe and the United States (OUP 2015).  
63 Anand Menon, “Defence Policy and the European State: Insights from American Experience” in D King and P Le 
Gales (eds), The Reconfiguration of the State in Europe (OUP 2015). Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative 
Federalism. The Changing Structure of European Law (OUP 2009) 59. 
64 Federico Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges 
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EU’s experience to an external benchmark (the US). When it comes to economic governance, 
literature on both sides of the Atlantic has focused on the path that, through market relations66, 
have accompanied the move from singular states to unions67. 
These studies have considered factors – from corporate governance structures to issues of state 
sovereignty – which had an impact on administration and regulation. Crucially, the key finding 
for EU lawyers is that the development of the US in the 19th century has resulted in a significant 
expansion of the institutional capacity of the American state over two centuries with a similar 
discernible pattern of institutional development in Europe68.  
In terms of administrative capacities, the standard narrative is that before the Civil War the US 
was a relatively weak state69. This was also true with regard to military capacity.70 However, 
authors such Mashaw and Perry have pointed out that the State weakness, if it existed, had no 
influence on the development of administrative capacity71. The account of the surge of the 
American State considers that it was vastly strengthened after the Civil War, for it had to respond 
to pressures to increase its security requirements. This critic period has been a major turning 
point in US administrative law. Thus, military capacity as an essential element of state-building 
was a catalyst of American development72.  
Independent agencies in American development  
The end of the Civil War also witnessed the birth of the modern independent regulatory agency, 
which emerged at the federal level began in the late nineteenth century. The first was the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, instituted in 1887 by the Congress. The ICC was the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(OUP 2016).  
65 Federico Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights in Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative Perspective 
(OUP 2014) 
66 Michelle Egan (n 62); M Egan “Toward a New History in European Law: New Wine in Old Bottles” (2013) 28 
(5) American University International Law Review 1223; M Egan, “Single Market” in E Jones, A Menon and S 
Weatherill, The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP 2012); Michelle Egan, “The Emergence of the US 
Internal Market”, in J. Pelkmans, D. Hanf, and M.Chang (eds), The EU Internal Market in Comparative 
Perspective: Economic, Political, and Legal Perspectives (Peter Lang Publishers 2008). 
67 A Glencross, What Makes the EU Viable? European Integration in the Light of the Antebellum US Experience 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2007); A Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union.” (2002) 40 (4) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 603; A Menon, and M. A. Schain 
(eds), Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative Perspective (OUP 
2006); JD Donahue and M. A. Pollack, “Centralization and its Discontents: The Rhythms of Federalism in the 
United States and the European Union” in K. Nicolaïdis and R. Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and 
Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (OUP 2001) 
68 Egan (n 62); Pollack, S. 2009. War, Revenue, and State Building: Financing the Development of the American 
State. Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press. 
69 Keohane, R. O. 2002. “International Commitments and American Political Institutions in the Nineteenth 
Century.” In Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development, ed. I. 
Katznelson and M. Shefter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
70 Anand Menon, “Defence Policy and the European State: Insights from American Experience” in D King and P Le 
Gales (eds), The Reconfiguration of the State in Europe (OUP 2015). 
71 Mashaw and Perry (n 18) 
72 Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development, ed. I. Katznelson and M. 
Shefter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 83 
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federal agency, but even before its establishment several states utilized the regulatory 
commission structure in their attempts to regulate the railroad industry.73  
After the ICC was set up, the US saw, together with the centralisation of power74 and the re-
building of the nation state75 an increase in its administrative capacities to regulate phenomena of 
federal interest. An aspect of this renewal of Washington’s power was an outgrowth of federal 
agencies (which in turn derived from the state commission movement which dated back to the 
early Nineteenth century76). The work of Mashaw as well links the centralisation of national 
administrative law with the growth and development of national administrative statutory law in 
three phases77. As Egan sums up, “[t]he expansive role for administrative discretion emerged 
under broad delegations of Congressional authority that generated substantial regulatory activity 
on the part of administrative agencies, contributing towards the consolidation and growth of state 
power, through permissive acceptance of administrative adjudicatory and enforcement 
authority”78. 
However, much as for the Banking Union agencies considered earlier in this paper, a 
remarkable feature of the agencies established at the federal level in the Nineteenth 
century was the scant need felt for executive direction and control, including, crucially, little 
judicial review of administrative action.79 More generally, a recent commentator of US 
administrative law has considered that “The	   administrative	   state	   seems	   to	   have	   a	   democracy	  
problem”	  and	  that	  “concern	  over	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  administrative	  power,	  together	  
with	  related	  concerns	  over	  its	  constitutionality,	  have	  been	  abiding	  preoccupations	  for	  scholars,	  
officials,	   and	   reformers”80. The state of the play on judicial review of executive acts was 
expressed in a punchy sentence by one the authorities of US administrative law, Kenneth Culp 
Davis: “The presumption was one of unreviewability throughout the 19th century.”81  
This attitude of several actors involved is derived not only from the ruling of Courts, but also 
from the behaviour of states attorneys. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, Breger and 
Edles state that “over the course of the nineteenth century, the Court was extremely reluctant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Breger Edles (n 21) 20 
74 Donahue and M. A. Pollack (n 67) 85 
75 Skowroneck (n 17) 
76 Robert Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 26 (1972) (“[I]n 1887, ten states had set up ‘strong’ 
commissions…possessing actual rate-making powers.”). 
77 J. L. Mashaw, 2006. “Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801.” Yale Law 
Journal 115 (6): 1256–344; Mashaw, J. L. 2007. “Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and 
Administration Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829.” Yale Law Journal, 116 (8): 1636–740 ; Mashaw, J. L., and 
A. Perry (n 18). 
78 Egan (n 62). 
79 Frederic P. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 Geo. L.J. 287, 292–93 (1948); 
Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 197, 221 
(1991). 
80 Jud Mathews, “Minimally Democratic Administrative Law” Administrative Law Review, Forthcoming Penn State 
Law Research Paper No. 8-2016, 2. 
81 5 kenneth culp davis, administrative law treatise § 28:1, at 254 (2d ed. 1984). In Decatur v. Paulding, the 
Supreme Court observed that “[t]he interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the 
executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied 
that such a power was never intended to be given to them.” 
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review executive decisions. As an example—albeit extreme from a modern perspective—the 
Court refused to compel the secretary of the navy to pay Stephen Decatur’s widow her pension, 
as required by a private act of Congress. Decatur v. Paulding82. Rather than ruling on the merits, 
the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the action fell within the secretary’s 
discretionary power”83. Equally, state attorneys (then called district attorneys) enjoyed 
considerable independence from the executive branch.84 This is because early attorneys general 
understood the opinions clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789,85 to be a limitation on their 
authority, rather than the basis to control legal opinions throughout the executive branch.86 The 
state attorneys’ interpretation allowed district attorney to conduct federal prosecution free from 
the control and jurisdiction of the attorney general87. 
Even though this “minimalist”88 approach to judicial review of executive power was 
reconsidered following the Civil War, it was only in 1897, that the Supreme Court reviewed an 
ICC act89. And the presumption of unreviewability, however, was not reversed until the Court’s 
1902 decision in American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty.90 Judicial reviewability of 
agency action in the post–Administrative Procedure Act (APA) era was later expressly 
established in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner91. 
Notwithstanding this “democratic deficit” and the problems of legal accountability of the 19th 
century agencies, several studies suggest that it was precisely the expansion of administrative 
law and steady growth of regulation to achieve market consolidation that strengthened the role of 
the state and underpinned American political–economic development92. 
It is worth mentioning that today, judicial review of agency action is thought as beneficial also 
because of “information forcing”, in the sense that it helps other branches of State to acquire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 39 U.S. 497, 513–14 (1840). 
83 Breger and Edles (n 21) 22 n 19.  
84 See Albert Langeluttig, The Department Of Justice Of The United States 2 (1927) (providing a historical account 
of the Department of Justice and noting that “[t]he Attorney General was given no supervision or control over the 
district attorneys”); Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive 
Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 74–75 (1983) 
85 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (authorizing the attorney general to provide legal opinions 
and advice to the president and department heads). 
86 See Lawrence Lessig, Readings by Our Unitary Executive, 15 Cardozo l. rev. 175, 183–85 (1993);  see also Keith 
S. Brown & Adam Candeub, independent agencies and the unitary executive debate: an empirical critique 10 (Mich. 
State Univ. College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-04), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100125## (“While the Judiciary Act of 1789 did create the 
office of Attorney General, it did not create a ‘department’ under him.”). 
87 For a full account, Breger and Edles (n 21) 20-22. 
88 I borrow this expression from Jud Mathews (n 80).  
89 The SC rejected the ICC’s conclusion that its statutory power to determine the reasonableness of rates included 
the power to prescribe rates. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 167 
U.S. 479, 500 (1897). 
90  187 U.S. 94 (1902). 
91 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
92 Novak, W. J. 1994. “Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in America.” Hastings Law Journal 45 
(4): 1061–97; Keller, M. 1977. Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America. Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Horwitz, M. J. 1977. The Transformation of American Law, 1780–
1860. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
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useful information from the agency93. Moreover, judicial review ensures that the agency bases its 
decision on a reasoned analysis of relevant information94:  “Fully aware of the consequences of a 
judicial remand, the agencies are constantly ‘looking over their shoulders’ at the reviewing 
courts in preparing supporting documents, in writing preambles, in responding to public 
comments, and in assembling the rulemaking ‘record.’” 95. An aspect of Judicial Review of 
independent agencies action is the so called Chevron deference, which consists of a two-steps 
enquiry: two-step inquiry –whether Congress has left a statutory ambiguity and if the agency’s 
interpretation in resolving this ambiguity is reasonable. If the test is met, then the Court cannot 
review the statutory interpretation made by the agency. However, some authors have argued 
against applying Chevron deference to independent agencies. In particular, Randolph May is 
championing the cause of jurisprudential change in this area.96He argues on the grounds of 
accountability, separation of powers and democratic concerns that judicial review should be 
more intense in the case of independent agencies because their characteristics diminish their 
democratic pedigree. 
  
4. Conclusion 
	  
What is the Banking Union and what may be its developments? This paper has argued that the 
APD offers a conceptual framework to theorise the role of independent agencies and their 
internal mechanisms of review. Further research may expand the analysis to the whole Banking 
Union system and offer a theoretical framework for understanding its standing under 
administrative law. 
 
European lawyers can learn a great deal from the US political development, as the abundant 
literature on the comparison between the two entities witnesses. This paper has concentrated on 
the newest developments of the Banking Union, and has found that the lesson from the US can 
be of tolerating the constant tension between independent, unelected agencies and the 
commitment of being governed by the people.   
 
In order to tackle the Eurozone sovereign crisis, the EU has adopted a new legal structure, the 
Banking Union, for the supervision and resolution of participating MSs credit institutions. As 
part of the SSM and of the SRM, a de facto agency (the Supervisory Board in the ECB) and an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 
755–56 (2006) (arguing that both the executive and judiciary overcome their informational disadvantage by forcing 
information out of the agencies in the form of detail, polish, and thoroughness of their explanations); Emerson H. 
Tiller, Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (2002) (arguing that the essence of hard-look review is to attack the reasoning processes of 
the regulator and force it to spend more of its resources on producing information).  
94 Sharkey, Catherine M., "State Farm 'with Teeth': Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive 
Oversight" (2014). New York University Public Law and Legal eory Working Papers. Paper 463, 117 
95 Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1412 
(1992).  
96 Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 453 (2006).  
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agency (the SRB) have been instituted. The article has considered the legal issues arising from 
the possible judicial review of these agencies’ acts, and has highlighted the main concern on the 
legal accountability of these bodies, and on the effective judicial protection of applicants who 
wish to challenge the agencies’ decisions.  
The decision to delegate power to agencies has major repercussion on the fundamental political 
organisation of the polity97, in the EU much as it had in the US. 	  
 
Worryingly low standards of judicial review have been studied in the American experience of 
political and administrative development in the second half of the 19th century. To control critical 
areas of the common market – namely those which may have been subject to monopolies, such 
as roads and railways – the federal state developed also through an outgrowth of independent 
agencies, which, at least initially, enjoyed large discretion and were not subject to judicial 
review.  
 
Notwithstanding this “democratic deficit” and the problems of legal accountability of the 19th 
century agencies, it was precisely the expansion of administrative law and steady growth of 
regulation to achieve market consolidation that strengthened the role of the state and 
underpinned American political–economic development.  
 
Integration of complex polities such as that of the US as it emerged from the Civil War, and of 
the EU as it is now, passes through phases of market building in which it may be necessary, for 
the expansion and strengthening of the State’s administrative capacity, to overlook concerns of 
judicial protection. The delegation of highly discretionary power may be a necessitated step.  
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